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Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets
WILLIAM W. BERRY III* & MEGHAN J. RYANt

In the recent case of Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme Court denied a
death row petitioner's challenge to Oklahoma's lethal injection
protocol. An important part of Justice Alito's majority opinion
highlighted the existence of a relationship between the
constitutionality of a punishment and the requirement of a
constitutionaltechnique available to administerthe punishment.
Far from foreclosing future challenges, this principle ironically
highlights the failure of the Court to describe the relationship under
the Eighth Amendment among three distinct categoriesof punishment:
(1) the type of punishment imposed by the court-e.g., the death
penalty, life without parole, or life with parole; (2) the method of
punishment-the tool by which the state administers the punishment;
and (3) the technique of punishment-the manner in which the state
administers the method of punishment. As Justice Alito suggested,
there is indeed a constitutional relationship between these
categories-even though this relationshipmay not exist exactly as he
indicated.
As such, this Article articulates a holistic model for applying the
Eighth Amendment on three levels-the punishment type, method, and
technique. This Article develops this taxonomy, making explicit the
concepts implicit in a number of Eighth Amendment cases. To be sure,
the Court has assessed types of punishments, punishment methods,
and punishment techniques individually, but it has never offered a
holisticframework by which to understandthese relatedconstitutional
inquiries. This Article develops such an approach.
In light of the applicableframework, this Article then explores the
Court's applicationof the Eighth Amendment with respect to the three
categories, demonstrating how the Court deviates from its doctrine
when consideringpunishment techniques. It next describes states' uses
of secrecy in the context of lethal injection, uncovering the manner in
which this secrecyfrustrates the applicationof the Eighth Amendment
* Associate Professor of Law and Frank Montague Professor of Legal Studies and
Professionalism, University of Mississippi.
t Gerald J. Ford Research Fellow and Associate Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The authors would like to thank June Grasso
of Bloomberg Law for inviting us on her radio show to discuss the oral argument in
Glossip v. Gross, decided at the end of the 2015 Supreme Court Term. This Article
stemmed from discussions following that initial conversation. The authors would also like
to thank Deborah Denno, Corinna Lain, Eric Berger, Rick Bierschbach, Chris Slobogin,
and Carissa Hessick for helpful thoughts and suggestions during the writing process.
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framework Further, this Article argues that the state-instigated
secrecy does more than create doctrinaland societal smokescreens-it
raises serious constitutional and legitimacy questions concerning
lethal injection protocols. Finally, this Article concludes by exploring
what transparencyin execution methods might mean, both in terms of
restoringdignity to death row prisoners andfor the future of capital
punishment in America.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"A lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense of insecurity."
- Dalai Lamal

In theory, the ways by which states execute those condemned to death
have become more humane over time. 2 The shift in execution methods-from
hanging and firing squads to electrocution, then to the gas chamber, and most
recently to lethal injection-creates a perception of increasing societal
maturity. 3 From the perspective of the average observer, death by lethal
injection certainly seems more humane than death by hanging or
electrocution. 4 This shift, however, tracks another phenomenon-the increased
secrecy in how states carry out executions. 5 Once a public spectacle, 6
executions now resemble a quiet, serene, medical procedure. 7 Indeed,
executions have become so private that they remain one of the few acts in
modem society that is not visible in some form on the Internet.8

IDalai Lama: I Shout and Say Harsh Words, TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2012) (quoting
the Dalia Lama), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tibet/9261176/Dalai[https://perma.cc/RQ8Y-EMPN].
Lama-I-shout-and-say-harsh-words.html
2
See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 206-07 (2002) (describing the
"continual centralization and professionalization of punishment" and the development of
new technologies of execution); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444, 447 (1890)
(explaining that states adopted electrocution as the result of an "effort to devise a more
humane method" of execution). Query, however, whether this increased decency rests only
in the eyes of the observer, not the condemned. See infra Part IV.
3 Jonathan S. Abernathy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence
Rationale, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379, 422 (1996) ("[Clontrary to what logic seems
to dictate, the attempt over time has been to make the penalty of death gentle, hidden, and
antiseptic."); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(explaining the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine).
4 Indeed, as Deborah Denno has observed, one of the purposes of adopting lethal
injection was to make the death penalty more palatable to observers. See Deborah W.
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 63, 86
(2002); see also discussion infra Part 111.
5 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 95 (2007) (describing the
increased secrecy of lethal injection protocols).
6 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 7 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage

Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing a brutal public execution involving drawing and
quartering).
7
See AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, 119-20 (2014).
8

DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE

OF ABOLITION 52-54, 296-97 (2010); see also Annulla Linders, The Execution Spectacle
and State Legitimacy: The Changing Nature of the American Execution Audience, 18331937, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 607, 618 (2002) (discussing the history of audiences at
executions).
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Lethal injection, as commonly used by many states, involves another layer
of secrecy that hides the killing-a paralytic agent such as rocuronium
bromide or pancuronium bromide. 9 The use of a paralytic agent hides from
those witnessing the execution what is really happening to the offender, as it
renders the offender unable to move.10 It appears that the offender strapped to
the gurney is drifting off peacefully into permanent sleep as part of a carefully
orchestrated medical procedure.11 But in many cases, this paralytic agent
masks the reality of the killing: the offender may be experiencing excruciating
pain. 12 The third drug in many protocols, potassium chloride, serves to stop
the heart of the offender, but can, with an ineffective anesthetic, "do so in a
torturous manner, causing burning, searing pain."' 3 Because of the paralytic,
though, bystanders often cannot observe any physical reaction to this pain.14
Further, it is difficult to tell whether the anesthesia given before the paralytic
wears off prior to death.1 5
The increasing difficulty of obtaining the needed lethal injection drugs and
surrounding controversy of the resulting changes in lethal injection protocols
have cast a third layer of secrecy over the execution process.1 6 States have, on
multiple occasions, refused to disclose the types of drugs used in the protocols
and have experimented with new drugs and new protocols without informing
inmates of the new procedures.' 7 They have also refused to disclose
information concerning drug suppliers and medical personnel involved in
carrying out executions.18
In essence, then, the secretive nature of lethal injection has resulted in a
series of executions that may in reality constitute a form of hidden torture by
masking severe physical and psychological pain. The trauma from lethal
injection administrations may be even worse when the drugs do not work
properly.1 9 This seems to have happened several times in the past few years,
9
State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenal
tyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/D53W-NK2T] (cataloging current state
execution methods).
10
Deborah W. Denno, The Future of Execution Methods, in THE FuTuRE OF
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 483, 485, 490 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009).
112 SARAT, supra note 7, at 119-20.
1 1d. at 120 ("[Bjoth the pancuronium bromide and the third drug, potassium
chloride, which causes cardiac arrest and death, have the potential to cause severe pain that
would13be masked by the sodium thiopental and/or the pancuronium bromide.").
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
14
Denno, supra note 10, at 490.
15
Id at 485.
16
As Legitimate Market for Execution Drugs Dries Up, States' Execution Practices
Become Increasingly Questionable,DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyi
nfo.org/node/6467 [https://perma.cc/KRU2-P2ZH].

I7 Id
18 d.
19

See SARAT, supra note 7, at 122-24; Dahlia Lithwick, When the Death Penalty
Turns into Torture, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitic
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resulting in horrific killings in which inmates visibly suffered for extended
intervals. 20
These procedures, however, have not gone without challenge. In June
2015, the United States Supreme Court upheld a lethal injection technique for
the second time in less than a decade. 2 1 This decision, Glossip v. Gross,
seemingly foreclosed further challenges to lethal injection techniques by both
sanctioning Oklahoma's new protocol and adopting a doctrinal standard that
petitioners will, in most cases, be unable to meet. 22
An important part of the majority opinion in Glossip advanced the
principle that, if a punishment is constitutional, then there must be a
constitutional way to administer the punishment. 23 While seemingly
foreclosing future challenges, this principle ironically highlights the
constitutionality and legitimacy issues that new lethal injection procedures
raise. The Court's principle suggests a constitutional relationship between the
punishment of the death and the ways that states administer it. 24 This draws
attention to the Court's general failure to clearly and systematically describe
such a relationship and distinguish three distinct categories of punishment
under the Eighth Amendment: (1) the type of punishment imposed by the
court-e.g., the death penalty, life without parole, life with parole; (2) the
method of punishment-the tool by which the state administers the
punishment, such as lethal injection; and (3) the technique of punishment-the
manner in which the state administers the punishment, such as by a three-drug
cocktail of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride. 25 If, as the Glossip majority insisted, a constitutional method and
26
technique must exist for a constitutionally approved type of punishment,
there must be a constitutional relationship between these categories. Further,
the corollary principle would suggest that, for a punishment to be
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, all three categories-the type,
the method, and the technique-must satisfy the applicable Eighth

s/jurisprudence/2014/04/clayton lockett s botched execution the grim but.predictable_
result of oklahoma.html [https://perma.cc/7ZRF-X4A3].
ESee, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732-33 (2015); SARAT, supra note 7,
at 122-24.
21 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; accordBaze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
22
See, e.g., Jonathan Keim, Glossip v. Gross: Holding the Line on Lethal Injections,
NAT'L REv. (June 29, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/420493/glossi
p-v-gross-holding-line-lethal-injection-jonathan-keim [https://perma.cc/A24T-5SF7]; lan
Millhiser, What the Supreme Court Just Did to the Death Penalty, THINKPROGRESS (June

29, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/what-the-supreme-court-just-did-to-the-death-penalty677a8b6f49e3 [https://perma.cc/XCH5-4UYC] ("Glossip v. Gross is a crushing blow to
opponents of the death penalty.").
23 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 47).
24
See id
25 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
26
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33.
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Amendment standards. 2 7 In the capital context, for instance, a court might
sentence an offender to the death penalty (the punishment type), using a
particular method (lethal injection) that implements a certain technique (the
protocol for administering the drugs). Each of these three categories-the
punishment type, the method, and the technique-must receive scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment.
This Article develops this taxonomy, making explicit the concepts implicit
in a number of Eighth Amendment cases. To be sure, the Court has assessed
punishment types, 28 methods, 29 and techniques 30 individually, but it has never
offered a holistic framework by which to understand these related
constitutional inquiries. This Article offers such an approach.
Having articulated the applicable framework, this Article then explores the
Court's application of the Eighth Amendment, demonstrating how the Court
has elected to apply a new standard in punishment technique cases. This new
approach has no connection to the text or history of the Eighth Amendment,
nor does it stem from the Court's own precedents. Not only is the Court's new
doctrine unfounded, but it is also built on a wall of secrecy that veils many
aspects of modern-day lethal injections. This, in turn, we argue, frustrates the
application of the Eighth Amendment framework. The state-instigated secrecy
does more than create a doctrinal smokescreen; it raises serious constitutional
and legitimacy questions concerning lethal injection protocols. Finally, this
Article concludes by exploring what transparency in execution methods and
techniques might mean both in terms of restoring dignity to death row
prisoners and for the future of capital punishment in America.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes "cruel
and unusual punishments." 3 1 In over 100 years of litigation, 32 the Court has
27
See
28

id
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-64, 578 (2005) (reversing a death
sentence for juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07, 321 (2002)
(reversing the execution of a mentally retarded individual because of his lower culpability);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (reversing a death sentence
for a rape conviction).
29
See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality
opinion) (finding that a mechanical accident during the first execution attempt by means of
electrocution did not make the second execution attempt unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (holding that electrocution is a
permissible form of execution under the Eighth Amendment).
30
See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878) (stating in an early case that
"[c]ruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but ... the punishment
of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first
degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the [E]ighth [A]mendment").
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assessed government actions in this context in three separate senses34
examining the type of punishment, 33 the method of punishment, and the
35
punishment technique. In the capital context, for instance, a court might
sentence an offender to death (the type of punishment), using a particular
method (lethal injection), which employs a certain technique (the protocol for
administering the drugs). 36 Each of these three categories-the punishment
type, the method, and the technique-receives scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment. To be sure, the Court has never articulated this three-part
taxonomy as such, but it has considered the constitutionality of each of these
categories depending on the challenge raised by a petitioner.

A. The Type ofPunishment
The first level of inquiry concerning the constitutionality of a punishment
under the Eighth Amendment assesses whether the type of punishment--the'
37
nature of the penalty itself-constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment. For
instance, one might examine whether the death penalty, imprisonment,
denationalization, or even a criminal fine constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment. 38 While the Supreme Court has held that denationalization
violates the Eighth Amendment, it has shied away from making such broad
holdings regarding other types of punishments. 39 Indeed, aside from
33

See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing
death sentences); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment bars denationalization); see also infra note 36.
34
See, e.g., Francis, 329 U.S. at 464; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
35
See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze, 553 U.S. at 41.
36
It is ordinarily a jury that imposes a punishment of death. See Hurst v. Florida, 136
S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) ("The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to an impartial
jury. This right required Florida to base [the defendant's] death sentence on a jury's
verdict, not a judge's factfinding. Florida's sentencing scheme, which required the judge
alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.").
Statutes, which may allow for the offender's election of method, ordinarily dictate the
method used. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1 (LEXIsNEXis 2015) ("A death sentence
shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively
elects to be executed by electrocution."). The technique employed in carrying out the
punishment is ordinarily in the hands of the state's department of corrections. See Denno,
supra note 4, at 182 tbl.20.
37
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977) (plurality opinion).
38
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (finding that the
offender's life in prison without parole sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (discussing whether the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment).
39
Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("In this
country the Eighth Amendment forbids [denationalization]."), with Furman, 408 U.S. at
239-40 (holding the death penalty unconstitutional, but only as applied). In Trop, there is
also the possibility that the Court was not prohibiting this punishment in all circumstances.
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denationalization, the Court has never held that any particular type of
punishment actually imposed in the United States is cruel and unusual in all
situations.4 0
It is important to note that this inquiry need not be an absolute one-such
punishments may generally pass constitutional muster but become
impermissible as applied-when imposed for a particular crime or on a
particular class of offenders, or when imposed as a mandatory sentence. 4 1 The
most noteworthy example of this came in Furman v. Georgia, where the Court
held that the use of the death penalty-when imposed in an arbitrary and
random manner-violated the Eighth Amendment. 42 Further, the Court has
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the mandatory imposition of
death, 43 as well as the execution ofjuvenile offenders,'" intellectually disabled
offenders, 45 "insane" persons, 46 offenders who commit felony murder in
certain circumstances, 4 7 and most (if not all) offenders who do not commit
homicide crimes. 48 All of these cases limit the type of punishment, but only in
certain narrow contexts.

Although the Court seemed to suggest that denationalization is broadly prohibited, in one
part of the opinion, the language could be read to suggest that the punishment is prohibited
only for the crime of desertion. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 93-94.
40
See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court has
never had to hold that a mode of punishment authorized by a domestic legislature was so
cruel as to be fundamentally at odds with our basic notions of decency."). In Furman,
Justices Brennan and Marshall both argued that the death penalty was a cruel and unusual
punishment generally speaking, id at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 371 (Marshall,
J., concurring), but a majority of the Court has never accepted this argument. The Court has
held that two punishments imposed by the federal government are unconstitutional,
although it is not clear that the punishments are unconstitutional in all situations. Id. at
239-40 (majority opinion). In Trop, 356 U.S. at 86 (denationalization), and Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (cadena temporal), the Court held that the imposed
punishments were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
41 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07; Coker, 433 U.S. at
592.
42
Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
4Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64, 578.
45
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07, 321.
46
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986)).
47
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 138, 158 (1987).
48
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 437 (2008) (finding the death penalty
unconstitutional for those convicted of child rape, but noting that the Court was "not
address[ing], for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and
drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State").
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B. The Method ofPunishment
The second level of Eighth Amendment inquiry assesses whether the
general method of the punishment is cruel and unusual. For example, one may
determine that the death penalty is constitutional under the first inquiry, but
the second inquiry would then assess whether a particular method of imposing
the death penalty-such as by lethal injection, hanging, electrocution, firing
squads, etc.-might be cruel and unusual. 49 To date, the Court has never held
a particular method of punishment to be unconstitutional. 50 In dicta, though,
the Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment does limit the use of
barbaric methods, such as burning at the stake, quartering, and public
dissection. 5 ' It remains an open question whether abandoned, or mostly
abandoned, methods of execution such as hanging, firing squads, and
electrocution still satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 52
C. The Technique ofPunishment
The third level of inquiry under the Eighth Amendment explores the
degree to which the mechanics of a particular method might be cruel and
unusual. For methods such as lethal injection, for instance, there may exist
ways in which administering the lethal injection might be constitutional and
other ways that may be constitutionally impermissible.5 3 Similarly,
incarceration techniques can also violate the Eighth Amendment, whether
imposed at sentencing or the product of poor prison administration. 54
This last category in the taxonomy of prohibited punishments is where
much of modem Eighth Amendment death penalty litigation lies. In particular,
there have been a number of challenges to various lethal injection protocols in

49
See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality
opinion); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890).
50
See, e.g., Francis, 329 U.S. at 464; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
51 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).

52 States

are continuing to explore returning to such methods, the most recent being

Mississippi. See William W. Berry III, The Execution Methods Crisis, JuRIsT (Apr. 3,

2017), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2017/04/the-execution-methods-crisis.php [https://perm
a.cc/D8F9-GMMB].
53Lethal Injection: Constitutional Issue, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Iethal-injection-constitutional-issue [https://permacc/5S6
8-NYEB] (summarizing recent Supreme Court lethal injection cases); see also Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015). See generally Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)

(outlining various Court members' perceptions of the administration of lethal injection and
the constitutionality of different lethal injection procedures).
54
0ne can imagine, for instance, a sentence entailing excessive amounts of solitary
confinement to violate the Eighth Amendment in certain contexts. Sharon Dolovich,
Cruelty, PrisonConditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881, 884, 961
n.306 (2009).
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recent years, and the Supreme Court has decided two important cases dealing
with this very issue.55
D. The Taxonomy as a Spectrum
It is worth noting that, while these three aspects of punishment-type,
method, and technique-are distinct, they exist as part of a spectrum of
punishment. In other words, they range from a macro-view of punishment (the
punishment type) down to the micro-view (the technique used to impose the
punishment), and it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the
punishment type, method, or technique is the appropriate category for analysis.
Despite this range of punishment, though, the same constitutional prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments applies; regardless of whether the
punishment type, method, or technique is at issue., "cruel and unusual
punishments [shall not be] inflicted." 5 6 Even though the constitutional
prohibition does not distinguish between punishment type, method, and
technique, the Court has recently applied different analyses depending on
which category of punishment is in question. 57 With little if any explanation,
the Court has applied one test to the first two categories (type and method) and
a different test to the third category (technique).5 8 When assessing the
constitutionality of techniques, the Court has strayed from its Eighth
Amendment precedents.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN ACTION
The Supreme Court has rarely found that any particular punishment type,
method, or technique, on its face, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments. Instead, questions of Eighth Amendment
constitutionality usually revolve around the specific use of a punishment type,
method, or technique. Historically, the Court's assessment of the
constitutionality of punishments has focused on the core Eighth Amendment
principle of dignity. This notion of dignity evolves as society matures, though,
so the Court must continually reassess dignity in light of changing societal
views of punishment and shifting accepted purposes of punishment. At the
heart of the dignity focus is the importance of, and consideration for, the
individual offender.

55

See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze, 553 U.S. at 41; see also infra Part IV.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
57
See infra Part III.
58
56

To be fair, the Court has never formally held that a particular method is

unconstitutional, but it has indicated in dicta that, in assessing methods, the evolving

standards of decency would apply to such situations. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
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A. Core Eighth Amendment Principles
In its 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles, the Court articulated two interrelated
principles governing the application of the Eighth Amendment. 59 First, Trop
established that human dignity is at the heart of the Eighth Amendment. 60 The
state must treat even the worst offenders-4hose who have committed a series
of brutal murders and those who have viciously raped children-with dignity
under our Constitution. 6' The Trop Court also explained that "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." 62 In other words, the concept of
dignity animating the Eighth Amendment evolves along with the evolution of
societal standards concerning the punishment and treatment of individual
offenders.
Dignity consistently serves as the starting principle for the Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis. 63 In case after case, the Court has stated that the
constitutionality of a punishment rests on the "dignity of man."M This dignity
requirement has at least two facets: proportionality and humanness.6 5
Proportionality refers to a sense of equality between the crime committed and
the punishment imposed. 66 Humanness refers to the notion that the punished
offender must be treated as a human being. 67 Along these lines, the Court has
repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture. 68
59
60

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
See id at 100. While some have criticized the use of the term "dignity" as vague

and even vacuous, the Court has consistently used it in its cases with specific meanings and
connotations, as explained above. See id. For a more developed discussion of the concept
of dignity, see generally Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the
Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129.
61 Ryan, supra note 60, at 2132-33. Bryan Stevenson captures this sentiment in his
book Just Mercy, where he explains that no one deserves judgment based solely on their
worst act, instead suggesting that one's personhood is more than just his or her
transgressions. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 17-18 (2014) ("Each of us is more than
the worst thing we've ever done." (emphasis omitted)).
62
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. This idea stems from the Court's decision in Weems v.
United States, where it suggested that the application of the Eighth Amendment would
change over time, as constitutional provisions were more extensive than the mischief that
led to their adoption. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Interestingly, this
view is consistent with an originalist view of the Eighth Amendment. See John F.
Stinneford, The OriginalMeaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel

Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1741-43 (2008).
63
See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2140.
6See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at
100); see also Ryan, supra note 60, at 2142.
65
See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2144.
66 William W. Berry III, PromulgatingProportionality,46 GA. L. REV. 69, 74 (2011);
Ryan, supra note 60, at 2145-46.
67
See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2144.
68
Seeid at2146.
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Eighth Amendment proportionality issues may manifest as either
excessiveness or comparative disproportionality. 69 A punishment can be
disproportionate in that it imposes a sentence excessive in light of the crime
committed 70 or the class of offender that committed the crime. 7 1 This
proportionality requirement includes assessing the individual characteristics of
the offender and the crime committed. 72 Further, to the extent that the
punishment goes beyond the bounds of justified punishment, it would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This includes a punishment that is
imposed at least in part for the visual pleasure of the audience or of the
punisher himself-a punishment involving sadism. 73
The humanness facet of dignity largely refers to the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on torture. The Court has firmly and repeatedly stated that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits all punishments involving torture. 74 For
example, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court stated that "it is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture, such as [public dissection and burning alive], and all
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth]
[A]mendment to the Constitution." 75 More broadly, the Court's cases have
clearly proscribed as cruel and unusual forms of "unnecessary cruelty" that
cause gratuitous "terror, pain, or disgrace," 76 including methods that cause
"torture or a lingering death." 77 This concept may even extend far beyond the
infliction of physical pain to also encompass psychological pain-both in the

69

Berry, supra note 66, at 90.
1d at 94; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420-21 (2008); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion). This-also applies to juvenile life
without parole (JLWOP) cases. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
71 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-67 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316-17 (2002); see also Berry, supra note 66, at 94.
72
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603-09 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). This also applies to JLWOP cases. Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
73
Ryan, supra note 60, at 2145-46; see Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.); cf Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (plurality opinion) ("The traditional
humanity of modem Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the
execution of the death sentence.").
74
See Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit
Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 567, 583
(2010).
75
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
76
Id
77
1n re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). To be clear, there remains an open
question as to whether punishments must be both "cruel" and "unusual" or whether it is a
unitary concept-"cruel and unusual." See Ryan, supra note 74, at 569, 572 (arguing for
the former-that the Eighth Amendment bars only punishments that satisfy both
categories). Here, the punishments described, while inherently cruel, certainly are unusual
in their administration as well.
70
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anticipation of the severe physical pain to come, as well as the inability to
exert control over stopping the infliction of pain.7 8
These facets of dignity focus in the first instance on the offender rather
than on society more broadly. 79 Both in its individual Eighth Amendment
cases and in its general approach to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Court has suggested that its understanding of dignity revolves around the
individual. 80 The proportionality facet suggests that punishment beyond what
is justified by the purposes of punishment-punishment for a different
8
reason-"loses sight of the individual" and is thus unconstitutional. 1 The
humanness facet indicates that "[t]here are some punishments that are so
inhumane, so uncivilized, that no one should be punished in that manner
82
not even humans who have committed the vilest of offenses." Punishments
83
This Eighth
that go beyond this boundary are also unconstitutional.
Amendment focus on the individual offender suggests that, although a
punishment's impact on society may be important, dignity requires
consideration of the offender himself.84
As the Trop Court explained, our standards of decency evolve over time,
85
To
so courts must continuously reassess our understanding of dignity.
determine whether society has evolved to a point such that a particular
punishment contravenes modem dignity standards and thus has become cruel
and unusual, courts examine both objective and subjective indicia of societal
values. 86
The primary objective indicium is the acceptance or rejection of the
punishment by state legislatures.8 7 The Court has also occasionally examined
the frequency with which juries impose the punishment, the opinions of
78

See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36; see also Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing on Teague grounds the question of
whether lengthy delays between sentencing and executions make punishments cruel and
unusual (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989))); Matt Ford, California's Death
Penalty Returns, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2
015/11 /califomia-death-penalty-ruling/415716/ [https://perma.cc/GH45-5DWD].
79
See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2132.
80
See id at 2144.
81 Id.
82 Id
83 See id
84

1d at 2132.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Meghan J.
Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Context?, 85
N.C. L. REv. 847, 849, 868 (2007).
86
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 563 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
87
See Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. This approach, which ordinarily equates to relatively
simple state-counting, constitutes a measure of the punishment's unusualness, although the
Court may subtly be moving away from this method. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2470-72 (2012).
85
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professional organizations, and international consensus.88 This examination of
the acceptance or rejection of punishments roughly tracks societal views on
the acceptance of punishments-whether they comport with modem
understandings of dignity. By tracking the acceptance of punishments, this
examination also reflects the unusualness of punishments. 89
Next, the Court brings its "own judgment ... to bear," subjectively
examining whether the punishment serves various penological purposes,
including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.9 0 By
looking at whether the punishment serves these purposes, the Court examines
whether the punishment is unacceptably cruel. 9 1 There is some dispute
whether a punishment is unconstitutional if a supermajority of states have
accepted it yet the punishment fails this subjective test,92 but, when faced with
the question of a punishment's constitutionality, the Court has seemed to
always find that a punishment either passes or fails both steps of this evolvingstandards-of-decency inquiry. In this sense, the objective and subjective
examinations work together to excavate the depths of the dignity concept.

B. The TraditionalApplication of These Principles
The Court has historically applied these concepts of dignity to determine
the constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment. It has
consistently done so in cases dealing with types of punishment, such as
denationalization and the death penalty, and also with methods of punishment,
such as with electrocution and term-of-years cases.9 3

88

See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (observing the frequency of juries imposing
punishment); Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (looking at the international consensus on a
punishment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (considering the opinions of professional
organizations).
89
See Berry, supra note 66, at 110-11; Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 81, 85, 120 (2010).
90
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 599; accord Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420, 434; Roper, 543
U.S. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-21. Query in the death penalty context whether
dangerousness is an overused concept. See generally William W. Berry III, Ending Death
by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L.
REv. 889 (2010). Note, however, the surprising relevance of rehabilitation. See Meghan J.
Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1231, 1231 (2013) (arguing that
much of modem doctrine is premised on the notion that imposing capital punishment spurs
rehabilitation); Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y
121, 122 (2014) (examining whether finality of a sentence promotes or undercuts
rehabilitation).
91
Ryan, supra note 89, at 85, 120-21.
92
See Ryan, supra note 74, at 603.
93
See, e.g., Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (mem.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94, 99-101 (1958) (plurality
opinion). See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudenceof Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REv. 169 (2011) (providing an empirical view of "dignity").
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For types of punishment, the Court has used the evolving standards of
decency to assess the dignity of the punishment in question. In Trop v. Dulles,
for example, the Court broadly determined that denationalization is an
unconstitutional type of punishment. 94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
first affirmed that dignity is the backdrop of the Eighth Amendment and that
this concept evolves along with societal standards. 95 It then explained that
denationalization "is a form of punishment [even] more primitive than torture,
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and
international political community." 96 The Court further explained that, if this
punishment were constitutionally permissible, the offender would, "[i]n short,
97
[have] lost the right to have rights."
In other type-of-punishment cases, the Court's rulings have been narrower
but still true to the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Kennedy v.
Louisiana, for example, the Court held that the punishment of death for thel
crime of child rape was unconstitutional,9 8 and in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court
held that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to intellectually
disabled offenders. 99 In these cases, the Court has also emphasized that the
"[e]volving standards of decency must embrace and express respect for the
dignity of the person."' 00 Consistent with precedent, the Court typically
assesses the state of these standards by examining both objective indicia like
01
state-counting and subjective indicia like the purposes of punishment.
The Court has also followed these Eighth Amendment guidelines in
assessing the constitutionality of punishment methods, although punishment
methods have rarely been challenged. In In re Kemmiler, for example, the
Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment did not proscribe executions by
electrocution (rather than hanging).1 02 The Court also suggested that the
dignity requirement of the Amendment prohibits torturous punishments,

94

Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
at 100-01.
Id at 101.
97
1d at 102.
98
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
99
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
100 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 ("As Chief Justice
Warren explained in his opinion in Trop v. Dulles: 'The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01)).
101 Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A Categorical
Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRUM. L. REv. 1371, 1396-99 (2011)
(discussing the objective and subjective indicia courts assess).
102
See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444, 446-47 (1890).
95
1d
96
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though.1 03 In other cases, the Court has relied heavily on this idea of
prohibited torture, emphasizing the Eighth Amendment dignity facet of
humanness.1 0 4 While not finding that any particular method is
unconstitutional, the Court has delineated the constitutional boundaries of
methods in such cases by pointing to examples of torture and distinguishing
the method in question from such examples.
Unlike with punishment types and methods, the Court has strayed from
these constitutional principles in assessing the constitutionality of punishment
techniques-an area that has recently seen significant legal attention. In this
arena, the Court has largely abandoned these foundational aspects of the
Eighth Amendment, focusing more narrowly on the elusive question of pain.
IV. LETHAL INJECTION AND NEW TECHNIQUES

The Supreme Court has historically followed these core Eighth
Amendment principles related to offender dignity in assessing the
constitutionality of punishments. To be sure, commentators have criticized the
Court for massaging the facts, fudging its state-counting, and giving mere lip
service to precedents, 10 5 but the Court has at least generally maintained its
Eighth Amendment framework when confronting these difficult issues. This
has held true as execution methods have evolved from hanging to more
modem methods. In recent years, though, the Court has strayed from these
core Eighth Amendment principles in examining the constitutionality of
punishment techniques. 106 These cases have arisen in the controversial context
of lethal injection litigation. Not only has the Court departed from its
traditional constitutional guideposts in assessing these lethal injection
techniques, but it also has weakened its analyses-and general legal and
societal assessments of these techniques-by allowing tremendous secrecy to
creep into the process of states executing individuals through lethal injection.

1 03 See id at 447 ("[Ilt is safe to affirm that punishments of torture ... are forbidden
by that [A]mendment to the Constitution." (quoting Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 13536 (1878))).
104
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36.
105
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court pays lipservice to
these precedents as it miraculously extracts a 'national consensus' forbidding execution of
the mentally retarded from the fact that 18 States-less than half (47%) of the 38 States
that permit capital punishment . . . -have
very recently enacted legislation barring
execution of the mentally retarded." (citation omitted) (quoting id at 316 (majority
opinion))).
10 6
See Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal
Injections, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1301, 1301 (2007) ("Distressingly, the courts evaluating
[Eighth Amendment] claims have almost no law to guide them.. . . No clear precedent
exists to guide courts in formulating ... remedies.").
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A. The Transformationof CapitalPunishment
Much of modem Eighth Amendment litigation has focused on the
constitutionality of the various permutations of imposing lethal injection. This
litigation has grown out of a long history of carrying out executions in the
United States.1 07 In accordance with the evolving standards of decency
framework that the Court first set out in Trop, "states generally have sought to
introduce more humane methods of execution once the actual implementations
of pre-existing methods were scrutinized and shown to be too barbaric, flawed,
or open to a high risk of painful or gruesome error relative to other available
options." 0 8 Hanging was the primary method of execution at the time of the
Founding.109 But in 1890, New York instead implemented use of the electric
chair after a series of disastrous public hangings before large crowds prompted
10 Over the next several decades,
a search for a less barbaric means to execute.o
states continued to experiment with other methods of execution, as the electric
chair did little to mitigate the perceived barbarism of execution. 1 1 Some states
used firing squads or lethal gas, for example, but the results were arguably
even worse than with electrocution. 112 In 1977, two Oklahoma doctors
developed lethal injection as a technique for carrying out executions. 113 States
viewed this method as an important improvement in the evolution of the death
penalty, as it boasted improvements in terms of cost, speed, aesthetics, and
legislative marketability.1 14 There was less concern about whether the method
115
was indeed a humane innovation in punishment.
B. Modern Lethal Injection Jurisprudence
By 2008, most states had adopted lethal injection as their primary method
of execution, and most of these states had adopted a three-drug protocol for
carrying out these executions.1 16 As the Court has explained:

107

Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4-12, Baze, 533 U.S. 35 (No. 07-5439).
108 Id. at 4-5; see also BANNER, supra note 2, at 169; Denno, supra note 4, at 91-92.
109
See Denno, supra note 5, at 62.
110
SARAT, supra note 7, at 63; Denno, supra note 5, at 62.
111 Denno, supra note 5, at 62-64; Far Worse than Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1890,112at 1.
Denno, supra note 5, at 63. See generally SARAT, supra note 7 (discussing the
development and demise of several execution methods).
historical
113
Ziva Branstetter, 'Father of Lethal Injection' Talks About History, His Legacy to
Oklahoma, TULSA WORLD (May 8, 2014), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state/father-oflethal-injection-talks-about-history-his-legacy-to/article_0bbl8eb4-7706-524a-8bf000a4f6117fa7.html [https://perma.cc/CJ2Y-NC3U].
114 Denno, supra note 5, at 65.
11 5

116

Id
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42-44 (2008).
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The first drug, sodium thiopental (also known as Pentothol), is a fast-acting
barbiturate sedative that induces a deep, comalike unconsciousness when
given in the amounts used for lethal injection. The second drug, pancuronium
bromide (also known as Pavulon), is a paralytic agent that inhibits all
muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm, stops
respiration. Potassium chloride, the third drug, interferes with the electrical
signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, inducing cardiac arrest.
The proper administration of the first drug ensures that the prisoner does not
experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by
the second and third drugs. 117
Around 2005, two death row prisoners from Kentucky, Ralph Baze and
Thomas C. Bowling, challenged this three-drug protocol as unconstituionally
cruel and unusual. 118 They argued that the protocol created an unnecessary
risk that the State would improperly administer the first drug-the barbiturate
sedative-and that the death row inmate would suffer significant pain as a
result. 119 The Court rejected this claim, but in doing so it strayed from its
traditional Eighth Amendment framework of assessing dignity and the
evolving standards of decency and instead focused on the potential pain
imposed by the punishment. Specifically, in Baze v. Rees, the Court concluded
that an offender must establish that the "lethal injection protocol creates a
demonstrated risk of severe pain." 1 20 The offender "must show that the risk is
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives." 1 2 1
After Baze, however, the question of the constitutionality of lethal
injection remained unsettled.1 22 Beginning in 2010, circumstances intervened
to complicate the business of lethal injection per usual, leading to additional
death penalty litigation. 123 In that year, the primary American manufacturer
for sodium thiopental, a commonly used lethal injection drug, stopped
producing the drug.1 24 Shortly thereafter, a major European producer of
pentobarbital, another barbiturate commonly used in executions, began
1l7Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
I 8 Id at46.
119
See id. at 47, 49 ("[P]etitioners claim that there is a significant risk that the
procedures will not be properly followed-in particular, that the sodium thiopental will not
be properly administered to achieve its intended effect-resulting in severe pain when the
other chemicals are administered.").
120Id. at 61.
121 Id.
122

Indeed, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Baze predicted as much. Baze, 553
U.S. 123
at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55

B.C. 24
L. REv. 1367, 1380 (2014).
1 Id ("In 2010, Hospira, Inc., the sole U.S. manufacturer of thiopental, ceased
domestic production of the drug at its domestic plant due to an 'unspecified raw material
supply problem."' (quoting Carol J. Williams, Maker of Anesthetic Used in Executions Is
DiscontinuingDrug, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/jan/22/lo

cal/la-me-execution-drug-20110122 [https://perma.cc/DG9K-B5DC])).
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requiring its customers to promise they would not use the drug in
executions. 12 5 Unable to secure a central drug used in executions through
traditional channels, states attempted to obtain drugs through questionable
sources, such as "a 'fly-by-night' middleman operating out of a west London
driving school," "a man in India who told [a] Swiss pharmaceutical
company ... that he would use their free samples to provide anesthetics in
Zambia," and compounding pharmacies, which are not subject to the same
rigorous regulation that large pharmaceutical companies are. 126 States also
continued experimenting with various new protocols for lethal injection to
continue carrying out executions with the drugs to which they did have
access. 127 For example, Florida was the first state to experiment with
midazolam as part of a three-drug lethal injection protocol in 2013.128 And
Ohio first used the drug in a two-drug protocol in 2014.129 States have used a
variety of lethal injection protocols that involve anywhere from one to three
drugs and make use of drugs such as midazolam, pentobarbital,
hydromorphone, vecuronium bromide, potassium acetate, and sodium
thiopental. 130 Again, death row inmates challenged these protocols, which led
to the Supreme Court revisiting the matter of lethal injection in Glossip v.
Gross.13

1

In Glossip, the Court again approved the method of lethal injection and
upheld the State's technique for carrying it out. 132 Drawing on its holding in
Baze, the Court explained that the petitioners had failed to establish that the
"protocol create[d] a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the risk [was]
1 33
With
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives."
125Id at 1381 ("[T]he Danish company Lundbeck, Inc., the world's sole producer of

.

injectable pentobarbital, announced that it would not sell the drug to states for use in
executions and would require its customers to pledge not to resell the drug to prisons.").
126Id at 1381-84.
12 7
See State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 9 ("The six executions carried out in
January 2014 represent[ed] four different lethal injection protocols, some of which
involved drugs never before used in executions . .
128
12 9

130

Id
Id

See id
131 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
32
1 1d It is worth noting that, although we refer to the protocols at issue in Baze and
Glossip as "techniques," the Court referred to these approaches to capital punishment as
"methods" in these cases. See id at 2738 ("Our first ground for affirmance is based on
petitioners' failure to satisfy their burden of establishing that any risk of harm was
substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method of execution.");
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) ("[T]he comparative efficacy of a one-drug method
of execution is not so well established that Kentucky's failure to adopt it constitutes a
violation of the Eighth Amendment."). Indeed, the Court has failed to distinguish between
techniques and methods.
133 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737. More precisely, because the petitioners were
challenging the denial of a preliminary injunction, the Court applied the corresponding
preliminary injunction standard: "The preliminary injunction posture of the present case
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respect to the risk of severe pain, the Court acknowledged that assessing this
risk is difficult. 134 "[F]ederal courts should not," the Court explained, "embroil
themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise." 35 As a
result, the Court emphasized that it is the petitioner who bears the burden of
establishing that this risk exists. 136 Because the petitioners had failed to
satisfactorily establish this risk that fell outside of the Court's area of
expertise, they lost on this ground.1 37 The petitioners also failed to establish a
satisfactory alternative. 138 With respect to this new doctrinal requirement, the
Court relied on the assumption that, if capital punishment is constitutional,
there must be a constitutional way to carry it out. 139 Although the Court

borrowed this idea from the Baze opinion,1 40 the Glossip Court transformed it
into a requirement that the petitioner establish a new acceptable way of
carrying out the punishment.141 Because the petitioners failed to establish such
an alternative, they lost on this ground as well. 142
Even after the drug shortages and constitutionality questions that gave rise
to Baze and Glossip, lethal injection remains the primary method of execution
in the United States.1 43 Although states have considered different lethal
injection techniques involving a variety of drugs, many have continued their
reliance on the injection of a paralytic.144
C. The Problem ofSecrecy
In addition to this transformation of doctrine in Eighth Amendment
technique cases, secrecy has increasingly crept into lethal injection executions.
Today, state governments shroud modern executions with multiple levels of
secrecy, a disturbing notion in an open, democratic society.1 45 Unlike most
events in modern society, executions do not appear on television or the

thus requires petitioners to establish a likelihood that they can establish both that
Oklahoma's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the
risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives." Id
13 4

See id at 2740.

135 Id (alternation omitted) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
1361d at 2739 ("[Pjetitioners bear the burden of persuasion on this issue.").
1 3 7 See id at 279-40.
138Id. at 2738.
139 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738-39.
140
See Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 ("We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that
capital punishment is constitutional. It necessarily follows that there must be a means of
carrying it out." (citation omitted)).
141 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737-39.
142 jd
143 Denno, supra note 4, at 69.
144 State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 9.
1 4 5 See GARLAND, supra note 8, at 55.
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Internet.1 4 6 Once a public spectacle, executions are now private affairs,
conducted in the presence of a small number of media, state officials, family
14 7
States
members of the crime victim(s), and family members of the prisoner.
evening
in
the
conduct these procedures in a clandestine manner, often late
and hidden from public sight.1 48 As a result, most Americans do not have
access to executions today.
Not only have executions transitioned from the public to the private
sphere, leaving most Americans without the experience of watching someone
die by lethal injection or firing squad, but also gaining any access to the details
of these executions is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. For example,
states keep the identifications of the executioners secret and, in the lethal
injection context, states also keep the identities of the drugs used to execute
the offenders hidden. 149 As lethal injection drugs have become unavailable as
European manufacturers have ceased making such drugs or boycotted their use
for the purpose of executing prisoners,1 50 states have further experimented
5
In many
with new drugs and protocols, sometimes with horrific effects.'
cases, states have elected to keep the identity of the new drugs secret, as well
as the names of the drug manufacturers.1 52 This is either to insulate the drugs
from challenge, maintaining some independence of the departments of
corrections that oversee the details of executions, or it is to protect the entities
providing the drugs from the protests of passionate anti-death-penalty
activists. 153 This secrecy complements states' traditional determinations to
keep the identities of executioners secret.
There is yet another level of secrecy involved in lethal injection, resulting
from often employing a paralytic to prevent the offender from screaming and

1461d; see also Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the Public and the
Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 461, 465-66 (1995).
147 GARLAND, supra note 8, at 53-54; Denno, supra note 4, at 63-64.
14 8

GARLAND, supra note 8, at 53.

1 49 Berger, supra note 123, at 1416-17; Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos
102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1379-81 (2014).
Post-Baze,
150
Manny Fernandez, Executions Stall as States Seek Different Drugs, N.Y. TIMES

(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11 /09/us/executions-stall-as-states-seekdifferent-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/7TPK-A4C7]; see also Andrew Welsh-Huggins,
Shortage of Drug Holds Up Some US Executions, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39385026/ns/health-healthcare/t/shortage-drug-holds-someus-executions/ [https://perma.cc/TJA9-MK7V].
1 51 See Denno, supra note 149, at 1366 ("Given the impact of drug shortages on lethal
injection procedures, it should come as no surprise that states are seeking help internally
from local compounding pharmacies for the production of lethal injection drugs. Yet recent
discoveries of subpar conditions and contaminated drugs demonstrate the risk posed by
compounding pharmacies." (footnotes omitted)).
1 52 1d. ("This risk provides states with an incentive to keep their lethal injection
protocols secret because of the foreseeable challenges that they will face should it become
known that the drugs are coming from pharmacies of this kind.").
I 53 Id; see also Berger, supra note 123, at 1416, 1418-19.
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writhing as the state pumps lethal drugs into his veins. 154 Instead, the offender
lies motionless on a gurney.1 55 Most three-drug protocols follow the use of an
anesthetic with the use of a paralytic.15 6 The paralytic renders the prisoner
motionless. 157 As a result, one cannot determine whether the anesthetic has
had, and continues to have, any effect.1 58 And the full panoply of effects that
the potassium chloride or other lethal drug has on the prisoner is unknowable,
and thus remains veiled. 159 The prisoner cannot communicate with anyone
because of the paralytic-he cannot speak or move.160 The prisoner often has
no visible physical reaction to the lethal drug other than to cease breathing. 161
The body's reaction to the three-drug cocktail becomes unknowable because
of the paralytic.1 62 The paralytic also helps hide the psychological reaction of
the prisoner to the lethal injection cocktail.1 63 Whether the prisoner feels the
helplessness of being conscious and paralyzed remains unknown. 164 This
psychological reaction, specifically as it reflects the degree to which the
procedure tortures the prisoner or otherwise degrades him by dragging out the
experience of dying, remains unknown. 165 Ultimately, these procedures appear
medical in nature, with the prisoner in a bed with an intravenous drip.166 The
secrecy of the procedures serves to mask the reality of the state's conduct
154

See Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
See Denno, supra note 4, at 100.
1 56 Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56 (describing how the paralytic drug would "mask
indications that the inmate was conscious and in excruciating pain from feelings of
suffocation as well as intense burning as the potassium chloride entered the vein").
157
See Denno, supra note 4, at 100.
1 58 See id at 100, 108-09.
159
Denno, supra note 10, at 484-84; see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49 (2008)
("[T]here is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly followed-in
particular, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly administered to achieve its
intended effect-resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are administered.").
160
See Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
161 Id at 98 ("[C]hemical quantities offer the most valuable and revealing indication of
a particular state's knowledge of the lethal injection process. But the mere listing of
chemicals is no assurance that department of corrections officials are conducting
procedures correctly."); see also Denno, supra note 4, at 109 (noting that an inmate might
be experiencing pain but it would be hidden by the paralytic drug).
155

1 6 2 See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of ConstitutionalRemedies, 27

YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 259,265 (2009); Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
163
Berger, supra note 162, at 265; Denno, supra note 5, at 67 n.110.
164
See Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
165
See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (mem.); Berger, supra note 123, at 1372 ("Without access to
information about execution protocols, the inmate's Eighth Amendment protection against
unconstitutional executions evaporates, because the state can conceal details of its
execution procedure, thereby insulating it from judicial review. To safeguard the inmate's
Eighth Amendment right, then, courts should require states to disclose all material details
of their
execution procedures.").
166
SARAT, supra note 7, at 119; see also Denno, supra note 5, at 66-67.
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toward the prisoner. 167 In many ways, the secrecy shields the lethal injection
protocols from legal and societal scrutiny.1 68
V. SHIELDING LETHAL INJECTION

The change in doctrine and increase in secrecy that have accompanied
experimentation with lethal injection techniques have led to the shielding of
lethal injection as a method of punishment and of the techniques used to carry
out this method. This shielding of lethal injection occurs in two ways. First,
the new doctrine and secrecy have erected a doctrinal shield, making it nearly
impossible to challenge the legality of lethal injection and its accompanying
techniques.1 69 Second, they have raised a societal shield, preventing the public
from effectively scrutinizing the appropriateness of lethal injection as an
70
execution method and of the techniques now used to carry it out.1

A. DoctrinalShield
Troublingly, the new lethal injection doctrine and the secrecy inherent in
lethal injection proceedings provide a doctrinal shield; with the details of the
execution remaining secret, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for
opponents to challenge the procedure under the Eighth Amendment. Glossip v.
Gross demonstrated this legal difficulty. 171 Following its decision in Baze v.
Rees, the Court in Glossip explained that a lethal injection technique must
pose a "substantial risk of serious harm" to violate the Eighth Amendment,
and the challenger must also demonstrate the existence of an alternative
technique.1 72 Without access to the identity of the drugs and executioners
employed, and with the use of the paralytic, potential challengers generally
lack clear evidence of the specific harms that the procedure poses and how the
technique might compare to alternatives.1 73 Accordingly, it has become nearly
74
impossible for challengers to demonstrate such a risk.1
First, the paralytic often employed in these procedures shrouds any
outward signs of the offender's pain.1 75 As a result, the procedure itself
1 67 See Berger, supra note 162, at 311-12.
168 GARLAND, supra note 8, at 53-55.
1 6 9 See infra Part V.A.
1 7 0 See infra Part V.B.

171 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
1721d at 2737 (majority opinion) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008)).
1 73 See id at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at 50.
1 74 Denno, supra note 4, at 117; see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.
175 Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional
Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 445, 448 (2007)
("[T]he use of a paralytic agent . .. masks the effect of the barbiturate sedative expended to
render the inmate unconscious. Because this drug renders an inmate unable to speak or
gesture, the inmate could be conscious and in excruciating pain without anyone else
knowing of his suffering.").
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ordinarily fails to provide direct proof of the offender suffering pain.1 76
Despite this difficulty, the recent "botched" executions do provide an
indication that lethal injection protocols have very possibly caused pain.1 77 It
remains unclear whether this is a result of executioners bungling the anesthetic
component of the protocol or whether an error in dispensing the paralytic has
just revealed pain that is ordinarily present when states use lethal injection.1 78
Second, petitioners generally lack the ability and resources to gain
information about the risk of pain inherent in any lethal injection protocol
outside of instances in which it is employed on criminal offenders. 179 And in
these circumstances, the government has not made it possible to study the pain
experienced by the offenders. 180 Outside of this context, there has been little, if
any, scientific research, or even the regular use of these - protocols.' 8
Accordingly, there is a lack of information about how these drugs interact in
one's body, making it difficult for petitioners to compile evidence that the
protocol poses a "substantial risk of serious harm." 1 82
Third, even if petitioners had access to information about pain possibly
imposed by the protocol, it is difficult to assess what constitutes a "substantial
risk of serious harm."1 83 Petitioners and the state alike lack technology to
reliably measure pain, and there has been little guidance about how much pain
is too much. 184 Pain imposed beyond what is necessary to carry out the
punishment is likely excessive and unconstitutionally cruel, but it remains
difficult to assess what amount of pain is too much. 185 In tension with the
Court's statement in Glossip that, "because it is settled that capital punishment
is constitutional, '[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional]
means of carrying it out,"' 86 the current techniques of carrying out lethal
176 Id
17 7

Berger, supra note 123, at 1372 ("[I]n recent years, there have been several
instances of botched executions, often involving grisly accounts of inmates convulsing or
crying78out from the gurney."); see infra Part VI.A.1.
1 Denno, supra note 4, at 99, 111.
179 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2792 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the petitioner's
inability to challenge evidence); see also Berger, supranote 123, at 1373-74.
1 80 Berger, supra note 123, at 1372.
181 Denno, supra note 5, at 70-75; see also Berger, supra note 123, at 1418-21;
Denno, supra note 149, at 1379-80.
182
See Denno, supra note 4, at 109-11 (describing how different bodies may be
impacted differently by the drugs).
183 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008); see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793-94
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
1 84 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Court's varying spectrum on what constitutes a "barbarous" punishment); see also Baze,
553 U.S. at 59-60 (discussing proposed technology to be used to monitor pain).
185 Denno, supra note 4, at 108-12; see also SARAT, supra note 7, at 22. See generally
PAIN, DEATH, AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (discussing the role that pain plays in
legal theory and jurisprudence).
18 6
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at
47).

2017]1

CRUEL TECHNIQUES

427

injection are not necessarily constitutional even if, among the currently
employed techniques of lethal injection, they carry the smallest risk of
imposing serious harm. 187 If all currently employed lethal injection techniques
constitute torture, for example, they would be unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual according to the Court's long history of proscribing torturous
punishments under the Eighth Amendment. 18 8 Thus, the death penalty can be
unconstitutional in all forms by practical standards of the Constitution despite
the Court's insistence that the type of punishment-the death penalty itselfremains constitutional.1 89
Fourth, the Glossip Court's determination that petitioners bear the burden
to establish this risk exacerbates petitioners' difficulties in obtaining evidence
about the risks of serious harms posed by a particular lethal injection
technique.1 90 The state is the party with the greatest access to evidence about
19 1
In
the employed technique and the risks it poses to individual offenders.
some circumstances, petitioners do not even have access to the protocol that
the state will use in the offender's execution. 192 And they certainly do not have
access to the identity of the executioners and thus cannot make a claim based
on the incompetency of the personnel carrying out the execution. 193 This
secrecy on the part of the state, paired with the unknown nature of the
protocols employed to carry out executions, make it nearly impossible for
petitioners to make out an Eighth Amendment challenge about the lethal
injection technique used to carry out executions.

B. Societal Shield
Not only do the new lethal injection doctrine and states' secrecy about
executions erect a doctrinal shield protecting the death penalty, but they also
support a broader societal shield. The effect of the three levels of secrecy
inherent in most lethal injection proceedings-the private nature of the event;
the secrecy surrounding the identity of the executioners, drugs, and drug
manufacturers; and the use of a paralytic-is a shield from societal scrutiny of
lethal injection proceedings. 194 In particular, by limiting the number of
observers, states stifle observational accounts of what might be experienced by
187

Berger, supra note 162, at 310-12.
See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 136 (1878).
189 Of course, at least two Justices on the Court have cast serious doubt as to whether
the death penalty is constitutional as a type of punishment. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 277677 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
190
See id at 2792-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Baze, 553 U.S. at 71-77 (Stevens,
J., concurring injudgment).
191
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1388-91; see also Denno, supra note 5, at 95-96.
192
Berger, supra note 123, at 1388-91; Denno, supra note 5, at 95-96.
193 Berger, supra note 162, at 304.
194 Berger, supra note 123, at 1432-36.
188
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those being executed. 195 By hiding the identities of the drugs used, many states
make it impossible for citizens to understand exactly the means by which
states execute condemned prisoners. 19 6 This also stymies attempts to research
what is happening to those being subjected to these drugs and procedures.1 97
By refusing to disclose the identities of the personnel and drug manufacturers
employed, states can ward off challenges to the competencies of these entities
and individuals making the executions possible.' 9 8 And by using a paralytic,
states hide any psychological or physical pain the lethal drug cocktail causes
the inmate. 199 Without more information about the techniques used to carry
out executions, the public (and the Supreme Court) cannot properly assess the
suitability of these execution procedures. 200
It is important to note that societal assessments of these death penalty
techniques should bear heavily on legal assessments of the techniques. The
Court's historical Eighth Amendment analysis that focuses on dignity and
evolves with societal standards relies in part on societal assessmentsprimarily state-counting. 2 0 1 If societal assessments change, then legal
assessments might change as well. Accordingly, the societal shield protecting
the death penalty feeds back into the doctrinal shield, making legal
assessments of death penalty techniques ineffective.

VI. THE UNDERMINING

OF LETHAL INJECTION

The doctrinal framework and the clandestine nature of lethal injection
raise the question of whether there are consequences to the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court and jurisdictions across the United States. A close
examination of the lethal injection protocol used by most states demonstrates
that serious consequences spring from the Court's new lethal injection
doctrinal framework and the decision to make the administration of the death
penalty largely secret. Specifically, the secrecy of lethal injection, paired with
the new doctrine the Court created in Baze and Glossip, raise constitutional
questions about the lethal injection procedures themselves, as well as about
lethal injection's legitimacy as a method of execution. 202
1 9 5 1d. at 1435.
196Id. at 1388 ("[Blecause they know their drugs and methods cannot be trusted, death
penalty states often keep important details of their execution procedures secret.").
Additionally, many states conceal information regarding "the qualifications of the person
inserting the catheter into the inmates' veins, the qualifications of the person mixing the
drugs, the qualifications of the person monitoring the inmate's anesthetic depth, the
chemical properties of the actual drugs used, and the amounts of the drugs to be injected."
Id. at 1391.
1 97 See id at 1418-21; see also Denno, supra note 5, at 70-75.
1 98 Berger, supra note 123, at 1416-19.
199
See Denno, supra note 4, at 100.
200See Denno, supra note 5, at 96.
20 1
See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
202
See infra Part VI.A-.B.
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A. ConstitutionalQuestions
In Baze and Glossip, the Court abandoned the full dignity inquiry that it
had previously applied in the punishment type and method cases like Trop and
In re Kemmler.203 Instead, the Court shrank the inquiry to focus on only the
possibility of pain suffered by the individual being executed. 204 In doing so,
the Court has strayed from its Eighth Amendment precedents, and, without
explanation, now treats punishment techniques differently than types of
2 05
punishments and punishment methods.
In contrast to the Court's approach to these lethal injection technique
questions, the Eighth Amendment does not distinguish between punishment
types, methods, and techniques. The Amendment instead states broadly that
"cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted." 206 As the Court has
stated over and over again that dignity is central to interpreting the meaning of
20 7
so too should
the Eighth Amendment for punishment types and methods,
dignity be at the heart of the inquiry of the constitutionality of punishment
techniques like those now used in the arena of lethal injection.
The concept of dignity transcends the question of pain that the Court
focused on in the technique cases of Baze and Glossip. As the Court has
demonstrated in its Eighth Amendment punishment type and method cases, the
core of dignity is proportionality and the humanness of the offenderquestions broader than mere pain. 208 As demonstrated in the Court's cases
limiting the use of the death penalty, Eighth Amendment analysis considers
2
the type, method, or technique brought to bear on the individual offender. 09
Indeed, the use of the technique with respect to the individual offender ought
to remain at the heart of the analysis.
The seminal case of Trop, itself, demonstrates that the dignity inquiry is
2 10
much broader than the Court's focus on physical pain in Baze and Glossip.
The denationalization punishment that was at issue in Trop did not involve any
physical pain, but instead the Court explained that the concept of dignity
203 Compare Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(ignoring the question of dignity and applying the substantial risk of pain test), and Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) (same), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(plurality opinion) (focusing on the question of dignity), andIn re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
(same).
447 2(1890)
04
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).
205 See id at 2737-38.
206 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
207See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) ("As Chief Justice
Warren explained in his opinion in Trop v. Dulles: 'The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01)).
208
See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
209
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
2 10
See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
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prohibited the punishment because it destroyed the offender's "right to have
rights." 2 11 Even though physical pain was not an issue, the punishment was
deemed inhuman and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. 2 12
The Court's new doctrine for lethal injection techniques and the secrecy
involved in these executions raise some serious questions about respecting the
dignity of the offender, which remains the bedrock principle of the Eighth
Amendment. In particular, doctrine and secrecy raise questions about torture,
experimentation on inmates, the neglect of viewing inmates as individuals, and
preventing humane offender knowledge. Further, this doctrine and secrecy
raise questions about challengers' abilities, and their rights, to raise these
important constitutional questions.
1. Torture
First, the procedures now used to carry out lethal injection, shielded from
both legal and societal scrutiny, 2 13 pose the very real possibility that states are
torturing prisoners, regardless of whether this is intentional. Although states
have limited the number of witnesses able to attend modem-day executions, 2 14
a striking number of modern observer accounts have suggested that inmates
being executed by lethal injection may very well be undergoing some sort of
torture. 2 15 For example, when Oklahoma executed Michael Lee Wilson, he
exclaimed that he could "feel [his] whole body burning" shortly after he was
injected. 2 16 In Ohio, witnesses observed Dennis McGuire "convulsing and
gasping for air" during his execution. 2 17 Similarly, those watching Clayton
Lockett's execution saw him "'writhing and bucking' on the gurney." 218 As
Justice Sotomayor explained her Glossip dissent, death by lethal injection with
midazolam creates a significant risk of severe pain. 2 19 The typical use of
midazolam occurs in cases where physicians intend to sedate a patient for a
short period of time. 220 Simply increasing the dose of midazolam may not
increase the time of sedation, though. 22 1 And if the midazolam wears off, the
inmate's experience would be the equivalent of being burned alive from the
211Id at 102.
212Id at 103.
2 13
2 14

See supra Part V.
GARLAND, supra note 8, at 53-54.

215 Berger, supra note 123, at 1372 ("[1]n recent years, there have been several
instances of botched executions, often involving grisly accounts of inmates convulsing or
crying out from the gurney.").
2 16
Lithwick, supra note 19 (quoting Michael Lee Wilson).
217 Id.
2 18
1d (quoting press reports of the execution).
2 19
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
220Id at 2783-84.
221Id at 2783.
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inside. 222 In other words, midazolam may facilitate the imposition of a
torturous punishment, hidden by a paralytic.
Individuals have observed these disturbing effects of the lethal injections
despite the paralytic ordinarily masking from observers any pain that the
inmate experiences. 22 3 In these botched executions, the intense pain caused by
the potassium chloride becomes apparent. 224 This suggests that the number of
instances in which these potentially painful experiences take place could be
significantly greater.
To be sure, it is unclear whether this outward appearance of pain mirrors
pain experienced by the executed individual. The pain actually experienced
could be either greater or less severe. The paralytic could be dimming the
appearance of pain by masking much, if not all, of it. Or the observed pain
could just reflect physical reflexes not actually felt by the offender. Without
adequate research on the effects of the drugs on the human body, it is difficult
to know what exactly the offender is undergoing.
In addition to masking physical pain, the paralytic could also hide
psychological torment. As the effect of midazolam remains unknown during a
lethal injection process, it is possible that the prisoner might be aware of the
paralysis, imposing severe emotional trauma on the prisoner. 225
Death row inmates are still human; a death sentence may extinguish their
lives, but does not deprive them of their humanity. To hide the details of the
lethal injection protocol or identity of the drugs from them, however, denies
them the dignity with which to face death. In some cases, denying such
information could arguably constitute a sort of psychological torture. 2 26 To the
extent that the state imposes torture-whether physical or psychological-it
strikes at the very heart of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments.
2. Experimentation on Inmates
The lethal injection procedures of many states likewise infringe upon the
22 7
dignity of the prisoner because of the procedures' experimental natures.
Because states are injecting prisoners with untested lethal drug cocktails not
properly assessed for safety, the prisoners strapped to the gurneys serve as
guinea pigs.22 8 The drug combinations and doses are novel, and it seems that
222Id. at 2793.
223
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1372; see also SARAT, supra note 7, at 120.
224
Berger, supra note 123, at 1372.
225
See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
226
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion) (discussing how the
unknown consequences of punishment cause the individual "ever-increasing fear and
distress" and are "offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands").
227
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1386-87 (noting botched executions as the result of
with execution procedures).
experimenting
states
2 28
Berger, supra note 162, at 267-68; see also Denno, supra note 4, at 99-100.
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the results-other than the likely death of the prisoner-are unpredictable. 2 29
The offender dignity that the Court has time and again said is the backdrop of
the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments
means that the individual offender must be taken into account in carrying out
punishment. 230 This equates to not experimenting on these prisoners even if
they have been legally condemned to die.
3. Neglecting the Individual
Even if the use of a paralytic does not result in physical and psychological
torture, and even if these novel procedures were not experimental in nature,
the decision to use a paralytic for the benefit of the obsewers undermines the
dignity of the prisoner. While preventing the prisoner frcm convulsing on the
table might comfort an observer, the decision to place the emotional comfort
of the observer ahead of the effect of the protocol on the prisoner ignores the
offender's dignity. 23 1 Under the Eighth Amendment dignity demand, the effect

of the procedure on the prisoner in killing him ought to be the central concern
of the state in establishing its protocol, not the degree to which the procedure
would be palatable to an observer. 23 2
The degree to which the masking of the procedure through the paralytic
satisfies a broader state goal to maintain public support for capital punishment
constitutes an even more objectionable threat to the prisoner's dignity. To kill
in a secretive way in order to engender public support for more killing strikes
at the heart of the concept of offender dignity. 23 3 An unconstitutional lethal

injection procedure does not magically become constitutional simply by hiding
it.
Further, the rationale for the adoption of new procedures in many states is
startling. States have not adopted new protocols or chosen new drug cocktails
because such procedures would improve the efficacy of the state killing or
reduce the prisoner's pain during such a procedure. Rather, the states have
adopted these new approaches because they are unable to procure the drugs
required by their prior procedures. 234 Indeed, the unavailability of drugs has
driven the new procedures, not considerations of the impact of the protocol on
the prisoner. 2 35 Attending to these outside reasons for adopting these protocols
that put the offender at risk compromises the dignity of condemned prisoners.
229

See Denno, supra note 4, at 108-11.
See Berger, supra note 162, at 310-11; see also supra notes 63-68 and
accompanying text.
231 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man."); Ryan, supranote 60, at 2144.
2 32
See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2144.
2 33
See Berger, supra note 162, at 310.
234
See Denno, supra note 149, at 1366; see also supra notes 150-53 and
accompanying
text.
23 5
See Denno, supra note 149, at 1366.
23 0
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4. Inmate Knowledge
The decision to hide the identity of lethal injection drugs and the details of
protocols likewise denigrates the dignity of prisoners. Irrespective of one's
criminal transgressions, one ought to, as a matter of human rights, receive an
explanation of the procedure by which the state intends to kill him, including
the drugs it intends to use. Even the Court's own decision in Ford v.
Wainwright,2 36 where it held that executing "insane" persons is
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, emphasized the importance of the
prisoner knowing what is happening to him. 23 7 There, the Justices explained
that, for a punishment to be constitutional, the prisoner must understand what
is happening to him and why. 23 8
5. Ability to Challenge
Finally, denying prisoners the information concerning the identities of the
drugs, drug manufacturers, and executioners, and the nature of the protocol
overall, infringes on their ability to challenge the constitutionality of such
procedures under the Eighth Amendment. Where the states use judicially
approved procedures, such a need dissipates, but in the current environment of
drug shortages and changing procedures, the ability to know the identities of
the drugs, manufacturers, and executioners, and the nature of the protocols, is
essential to making a constitutional challenge-a right that every offender
should have. 239
B. Legitimacy Questions
In addition to the many constitutional questions that they raise, the new
doctrine and secrecy in executions also suggest a number of questions related
to the legitimacy of the method of execution itself. To be palatable, the death
penalty must provide the community with a sense that it achieves justice in a
236 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986); see also Stewart v. MartinezVillareal, 523 U.S. 637, 639 (1998) (affirming the Fordprinciple).
2 37
See Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 ("It is no less abhorrent today than it has been for
centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from
comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications."); id at 422 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I would hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.").
2 38
See id at 417 (majority opinion); id at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954-60 (2007)
(holding that the state should not execute a person if the person does not understand the
reason for their imminent execution). For an interesting discussion on how the Panetti
decision relates to retributive theory, see generally Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism:
and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. L. REv. 1163 (2009).
Panetti
239
See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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meaningful way through execution. 2 40 At the heart of this effort is drawing a
clear distinction between the act of execution and the killing that necessitated
the execution-a distinction between lawful and unlawful killings. 2 4 1 To
accomplish this, the state must find a way of killing that "does not allow the
condemned to become an object of pity, or to appropriate the status of the
victim." 242
Historically, the state achieved legitimacy in its use of the death penalty by
making public executions the center of its approach. 243 This included
attempting to achieve some level of equivalence between the pain inflicted in
the crime and the pain inflicted in the state killing. 244 Public executions also
served the goal of general deterrence.
As society's standards of decency have evolved, however, the source of
legitimacy has shifted. Instead of achieving legitimacy through brutality, states
increasingly have achieved legitimacy through making the killing seem
dignified, quiet, and tranquil. 24 5 The decision to adopt lethal injection as a
method, including employing a paralytic, arose from such a sentiment-that
societal support of the death penalty hinged upon minimizing its brutality. 246
Ironically, however, the use of secrecy in lethal injection procedures has
the opposite effect-it threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the method
and its procedures, as well as the death penalty more generally. The use of the
paralytic in carrying out executions raises questions as to whether the
procedure itself matches the calm medical procedure it portrays. 247 As the
paralytic is not necessary to accomplish the killing, its use raises important
questions about legitimacy. 248
First, if the paralytic masks real and significant pain, then the state
effectively hides its method of barbaric killing from the public. Further, if the
paralytic's only purpose is to hide this pain-a serious possibility considering
that the paralytic serves no real medical purpose here-then using it raises
serious questions about what the state intends to hide.
Second, if the paralytic masks only subtle, painless manifestations of
lethal injection, such as a body violently convulsing in response to a lethal
drug, it still suggests that the procedure performed has some impropriety. The

24 0
24 1

See Denno, supranote 4, at 91-92.
See SARAT, supra note 7, at 4.

242Id. at 4-5.
243 Id at 7-8; see also GARLAND, supra note 8, at 24-25; Madow, supra note 146, at
465.
244 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 4-9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982);

GARLAND, supra note 8, at 64; SARAT, supra note 7, at 4-5.
245
See Madow, supra note 146, at 469.
246
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42-44 (2008).
24 7
Denno, supra note 4, at 100.
24 8
See id (noting that pancuronium bromide creates the appearance that the inmate is
serene, but the inmate could actually be in pain).
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decision to hide the true consequence of lethal injection from observers
249
suggests, at the very least, some public discomfort with the procedure.
To be sure, the manner in which the state carries out lethal injection
procedures presents a misleading picture. By making the lethal injection
appear like a peaceful, tranquil medical procedure, the state attempts to
2 50
differentiate its killing from the condemned aggravated murder it punishes.
But the secrecy of the process-the great lengths taken to hide the reality of
the state's act, which amounts to a violent taking of a human life-casts doubt
on the legitimacy of the killing.
The broader secrecy surrounding death procedures likewise raises
questions about the legitimacy of lethal injection. By hiding the execution
from society, the state disassociates the reality of its killings from the justice it
purportedly imposes. 2 51 States do not have to televise executions to secure
their legitimacy, but cloaking them with secrecy and making them generally
unavailable to the media, much less the public at large, undermines their
efficacy in distinguishing these killings from unlawful ones and also in
deterring future offenders. 252
The decision to hide the identities of the drugs and their manufacturers,
and the identities of the personnel involved in the executions, likewise
undermines the legitimacy of lethal injection. 253 The fear of retaliation from
those who oppose the death penalty does not entirely explain or justify this
secrecy. 2 54 Further, the lengths to which states have gone to obtain lethal
injection drugs, including alleged illegal methods of doing so, suggests a
surprising desperateness to execute those condemned to die, at least in some
states. But the decision to hide the means by which the state endeavors to do
so indicates a degree of shame or perhaps impropriety that makes secrecy
necessary. 2 55 The secrecy obscures an entire line of inquiry about the
appropriateness of the state conducting the procedure in the first place.
Finally, hiding the process by which the state executes its prisoners
undermines legitimacy in that it offends basic concepts of democracy. Again,
it erects a societal shield by which ordinary citizens lack the resources to form
249

Cf Madow, supra note 146, at 556-57 (discussing how displaying executions
publicly might "arous[e] pity" for the criminal or would shame people into "abolishing
executions" (quoting in part HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY 214 (1993))).
250
See SARAT, supra note 7, at 4.
251 See GARLAND, supra note 8, at 53-55.
252
A 2011 Georgia lethal injection was videotaped, but kept under seal by the judge.
Erica Goode, Video of a Lethal Injection Reopens Questions on the Privacy ofExecutions,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/us/24video.html
[https://perma.cc/9RE4-FUQQ].
253
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1388, 1416, 1418-19.
254
See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733 (2015); see also Berger, supra note
123, at 1416.
2 55
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1416.
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educated opinions about the propriety of these executions. 256 In order to
determine whether a death procedure is consistent with societal values,
citizens must have some understanding of the manner in which the state
imposes capital punishment. 257 The clandestine nature of the proceeding, the
failure to disclose the identity of the drugs used and their manufacturers, the
lack of information about the executioners, and the effects of the lethal
injection cocktail hidden by the paralytic all hide common knowledge of the
death penalty. 258 This thwarts the democratic principle of providing citizens a
voice in the manner in which a state punishes its criminals.
In sum, the Court's new doctrine and the extreme secrecy involved in
today's executions raise real questions of legitimacy. Portraying modem
executions as serene medical procedures serves evolved societal expectations
of decency. But this portrayal also shifts the justification for the practice from
achieving equivalence between the crime and punishment through brutality to
making the punishment death alone rather than one accompanied by pain and
suffering. States have gone to great lengths to construct this image. But states'
insistence on the many levels of secrecy shrouding modem executions
paradoxically reveals that this image may be just that-only an image. Instead
of justifying executions, this secrecy raises concerns about the legitimacy of
executions.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSPARENCY
The Court's new doctrine and the veil of secrecy surrounding today's
executions raise the question of what consequences might flow from
transparency. Transparency could be achieved on several levels. Televising or
streaming executions would make them publicly available. 2 59 This would spur
the public to be more aware of the executions that are currently taking place
behind closed doors and it would also at least in part expose the gruesome
nature of these events. 260 The thought of making executions mainstream may
seem unnecessary and horrifying, 26 1 but, if this is the case, perhaps that means
that executions, themselves, are unnecessary and horrifying. If our appetites
for brutality and violence have changed since the first executions in this
country, then perhaps our punishments should change as well, and not just in
their appearances. Hiding the brutality does not change the brutality.
Eliminating the use of paralytics in executions and revealing the drugs,
drug manufacturers, and executioners involved in lethal injection procedures
256

See supra Part V.B.

257 See Denno, supra note 5, at 96.
25 8
See Berger, supra note 123, at 1432-36.
259 GARLAND, supranote 8, at 55; see also Madow, supra note 146, at 465-66.
260 See Denno, supra note 4, at 105-07.
261 One might also object to the public nature of such executions on the ground of the
offender's dignity. However, preserving offender choice might be a good way to preserve
offender dignity but retain transparency in at least some circumstances.
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could also improve transparency. 2 62 These moves would be less extreme and
likely would be more politically palatable and easier to achieve. Eliminating
these levels of secrecy, though, would begin to shatter the impression that
modem executions are serene medical events. 26 3 Even by lifting only these
less extreme measures of secrecy, significantly greater transparency can be
achieved, ameliorating some of the constitutional and legitimacy concerns
already raised. If the states removed the paralytic, one could view, at least
externally, the effect of the drugs on the prisoner, including the physical and
verbal reaction of the prisoner to the drugs. 264 Making the identities and
manufacturers of the drugs employed publicly available would allow further
study of the drugs and increase the understanding of how they might operate to
kill the prisoner. 265 Similarly, identifying the individual executioners might
26 6
generate an evaluation of the qualifications needed to conduct an execution.
Exposing all of these facets of executions would spur a reassessment of
whether the techniques uphold the dignity of executed offenders. 267 It would
further a more informed determination of whether these executions amount to
torture. 268 It would provide the opportunity for further research on the drugs
employed so that experimentation on the death row offenders would no longer
be necessary. 269 It would refocus the spotlight on what the individual
2 70
And it
offenders are experiencing rather than on the observer's experience.
would allow the offenders to have adequate information about what will
happen to them during the procedure. 27 1 In each of these senses, states would
be less likely to violate the Eighth Amendment requirement of respecting
offender dignity.
The perhaps more significant consequence of making lethal injection
executions more transparent would be a societal reconsideration of lethal
injection as a method of execution, and the acceptability of the death penalty
more generally. 272 Removing the paralytic might reveal a more gruesome kind
of death penalty. The true nature of lethal injection, unsheathed, might not
273
The
reflect the serene scene projected by procedures using a paralytic.
262

Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
263 Without the paralytic there would be no mask to hide "indications that the inmate
was conscious and in excruciating pain from feelings of suffocation as well as intense
burning as the potassium chloride entered the vein." Id
264 See id
265

See Berger, supra note 123, at 1432-36.
2661d at 1433.
267
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See supra Part VI.A.

See supra Part VI.A.1.
See supra Part VI.A.2.
270
See supra Part VI.A.3.
271 See supra Part VI.A.4.
272 Indeed, Justice Breyer's dissent in Glossip, joined by Justice Ginsburg, called for a
re-examination of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct.
2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 73
See Denno, supra note 5, at 55-56.
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botched lethal injections in recent years demonstrate this reality. 274 If a
paralytic-free lethal injection even partially mirrors the botched execution
outcomes, then the death penalty will face the same scrutiny as it did during
the time that states abandoned electrocution for lethal injection. 27 5 As with
electrocution, such a method would raise constitutional questions, both in
terms of torture and dignity more broadly.
Similarly, a public understanding of the drugs states use, and the
physiological manner in which they cause death, might undermine public
enthusiasm for lethal injection as a method of execution. The idea that states
are experimenting on death row inmates may strike some observers as
unsavory and questionable. The lack of medical knowledge concerning how
the chosen drug cocktails interact might also cast doubt upon lethal injection
as a method of execution.
Further, a review of the credentials held by executioners might give public
observers pause. Greater examination of the roles of the medical personnel
involved-or to the extent medical personnel are not involved-in executions
could dispel for some the myth of the medical nature of today's lethal
injections. This, too, might have an effect on the public's acceptance of any
particular lethal injection technique or of the method of lethal injection overall.
Greater transparency, then, might call into question modem lethal
injection techniques and the method of lethal injection itself. In light of the
current pharmaceuticals available, 2 76 states may not be able to administer
lethal injection in a way that does not cause a violent physical reaction on the
part of the prisoner. States may not be able to administer it in a way that does
not constitute experimentation on vulnerable human beings. If the public will
not tolerate these modem techniques, then perhaps we must search for a
different method of execution. Some states and scholars have already called
for a return to firing squads, electrocution, and other execution methods. 2 77
Whether it is constitutional to reach back into history and resurrect old
methods of execution remains to be decided. 2 78 But it is important to
remember that states largely disregarded these older methods with the advent
of lethal injection because of the belief that other methods were much more
brutal. While a small, conservative minority might embrace a return to one or
more of these methods, an affirmative step to use one of these techniques may

2 74

See, e.g., SARAT, supra note 7, at 144; Lithwick, supra note 19.
See Denno, supra note 4, at 77-90 (discussing the transition from electrocution to
lethal injection as the states' preferred death penalty procedure).
276
See Denno, supranote 149, at 1360-66.
277 Associated Press, States Consider Electrocution, Hanging, Firing Squads as
Execution Drugs Get Hard to Find, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://www.nola-com/politics/index.ssf2015/1 0/statesconsider electrocution.html
[https://perma.cc/ARR4-95YU].
2 78
See Berry, supra note 52.
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also further diminish support for capital punishment. 2 79 A single hanging or
electrocution might be enough to convince many states to pursue the path
toward abolition, like seven states have done since 2004.280 So, with an
acceptable method of punishment in question, the propriety of the death
penalty, itself, is also in question. Indeed, the future of the death penalty might
hinge on the ability of states to conduct lethal injections in a humane manner.
A core sentiment in the Glossip opinion rested upon making sure that the
"guerilla warfare" attacks on suppliers of lethal injection drugs by death
penalty abolitionists did not succeed. 28 1 As such, if the death penalty is
constitutional, the Court explained, there must be a constitutional technique for
administering it.282 For any particular punishment to be constitutional,
however, every facet of the punishment must be constitutional-the technique,
the method, and the type of punishment. If there is no constitutional way to
carry out the punishment of death then, although the death penalty itself may
be constitutional, states cannot legally use it. Just because the death peralty
may in theory be constitutional does not mean that the Constitution tolerates
torture just to impose that type of punishment.
Certainly, it is unlikely that the unavailability of a particular technique or
method of execution will result in the ultimate death of capital punishment in
America. Nonetheless, transparency in the current lethal injection
procedures-including public viewing of the killings; public knowledge of the
drug identities, drug manufacturers, and individual executioners; and removal
of the paralytic-might be an important means to accelerate the decline of the
death penalty in the United States. If the public had information to actually
assess the propriety of these death penalty techniques, it could really affect
societal assessment of them. The popularity and constitutionality of the death
penalty has waxed and waned in this country since its founding. 283 In 2015,
the death-sentencing rate again declined, and the number of executions

279 There are significant questions as to whether a return to older methods would be
constitutional. Id. But see Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.) (arguing that Arthur's request for a firing
squad satisfies the Glossip standard).
280States with and Without the Death Penalty as of November 9, 2016, DEATH

PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/5XDE-R4NF]; see also Meghan J. Ryan, On the Road to Abolition:
Capital Punishment and Its Uncertain Future in the United States, JURIST (Feb. 24,
2016), http://jurist.org/forum/2016/02/meghan-ryan-capital-punishment.php [https://perma.
cc/5RVG-GAX5].
281 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733-34 (2015); Kim Bellware, Justice Alito
Blasts Death PenaltyAbolitionistsfor 'GuerrillaWar,' HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 29, 2015),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/29/alito-death-penalty-guerrilla-war-n_717571
[https://perma.cc/ND8N-U6T2].
8.html
282
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33.
283 Jeffrey M. Jones, The Death Penalty, GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2002),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9913/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EFK-MS3R].
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decreased. 2 84 Perhaps even more tellingly, the geography of the use of the
death penalty over the past decade reveals that only a handful of counties are
responsible for a large majority of the executions in the United States. 2 85 Even

in recent polls asking whether the death penalty is a good idea, people's
answers differ depending on how the question is asked. If the surveyed
individuals are given the option of a heinous murderer being sentenced to life
in prison instead of death, their support for the death penalty drops. 286 Without
a doubt, support for the death penalty continues to decline, even with the
current clandestine use of lethal injection. 2 87 And maintaining secrecy about
the details of capital punishment fosters support for the punishment. 28 8
Without this secrecy, public support for lethal injections could very well
plummet.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's modem approach to lethal injection jurisprudence is
problematic. In its recent cases, the Court has strayed from its traditional
Eighth Amendment precedents in addressing whether various lethal injection
techniques amount to unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishments.
Instead of focusing on the dignity of offenders and the evolving standards of
decency that affect this analysis, the Court has focused almost exclusively on
offender pain. In doing so, the Court has separated out lethal injection
technique questions from more traditional questions of punishment types and
methods. Problematically, the Court has done this without acknowledging or
explaining the reasons for this departure.
While creating this new doctrine, the Court has also tolerated significant
secrecy to creep into the practice of lethal injection. These components have
shielded lethal injection from effective doctrinal challenges as well as from
true societal scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's new doctrine and the secrecy that
surrounds today's executions raise a whole host of constitutional and
legitimacy concerns. Together, they hide the potentially torturous
consequences of lethal injection, cultivate experimentation on death row
inmates, neglect the individual offender, and prevent inmates from
284See generally DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2015: YEAR

END REPORT (Dec. 2015), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2015YrEnd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW8B-XAY4].
28 5
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for
Eliminating Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 308-09 (2010);
Robert J. Smith, Essay, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92
B.U. L. REv. 227,228 (2012).
286 Jones, supra note 283.
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See generally DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 284; THE ROAD TO
ABOLITION? THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Charles J.

Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009); Denno, supra note 149, at 1345 (discussing
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understanding what is happening to them in their final hours. Further, the
Court's approach makes it exceedingly difficult for death row inmates to
challenge the techniques that will be used to carry out their lethal injection
executions. Additionally, because of the great lengths to which states go to
hide the nuances of their lethal injection procedures, one might argue that the
justifications for execution diminish with the decreased deterrence value and
retributive force of medicalized executions.
Transparency in the realm of executions may be difficult to implement,
but lifting at least one layer of secrecy could very well expose the unsettling
underbelly of executions in modem-day America. It could reveal unintentional
torture, experimentation, and various incompetencies. This could, in turn,
significantly erode support for lethal injection and the death penalty overall.
The Glossip Court suggested that, because the death penalty is
constitutional, there must be a constitutional way to carry it out. But the
constitutionality of the death penalty cannot justify torturous or otherwise
unconstitutional punishment methods or techniques. In losing sight of the
relationship between punishment types, methods, and techniques, the Court
lost its way in navigating how the Eighth Amendment must apply to lethal
injection and the various techniques for carrying it out. In doing so, the Court
has unintentionally undermined not only the constitutionality of the death
penalty as applied in this country but also its legitimacy.

